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Abstract
After Mongolian troops entered Sichuan Area in the 
Ogedei Period, although they caused serious damages 
to the areas of Chongqing-Sichuan in the years 1236-
1241, they could not reach a substantial occupation of 
Sichuan due to the fault of simplex attacking-and-raiding 
strategy.  In such a case, Southern Song troops were able 
to apply the policy of consolidating Sichuan.Song troops 
in Sichuan led by Yu Jie gradually regained lost territories 
and constructed a mountainous town defense system 
(MTDS) centering on Chonqing which has advantageous 
terrain of mountains. In the Mongka Period, in view of 
faults of military tactics in the Ogedei Period, Mianzhou 
Town and Lizhou Town were restored successively outside 
Sichuan to facilitate access to Sichuan from the north. 
In the years from 1258 to 1259, while the main force of 
Mongolian troops led by Mongka was attacking Sichuan, 
some soldiers were quartered to guard the occupied Song 
towns. Although the death of Mengge made the Song-
Mongolia War come to an end temporarily, the Mongolian 
troops still substantially occupied certain areas of Sichuan 
in the Mongka Period.  To the Kublai Period, on the one 
hand, civil strives broke out due to the fight for the title of 
Khan; on the other hand, strategic focus of attacking was 
transferred to the area of Lianghuai after the civil strives 
were put down. Under this circumstance, in order to 
contain the Song troops with partial force, the Mongolia 
troops in Sichuan battlefield inherited and developed 
the tactics of conducting military activities relying 
on military towns derived from the Mongka Period. 
Numerous military towns were restored and built against 
the mountainous defense system and the consolidation 
of occupied territories from the Mongka Period was thus 
completed.
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INTRODUCTION
In the historical time of China, early people constructed 
many military settlements for the purpose to defend or 
attack. After 1980s, researchers from various disciples 
using thier own special perspectives, deeply studied 
military settlements of different periods and locations. 
As a special form of settlement in historical time, 
military settlement shows its research value. By the 
efforts of previous researchers, military settlement 
study in Chongqing-Sichuan area (巴渝地区)  has had 
now many research achievements, especially in terms 
of Sichuan-Shanxi Mountainous towns of Southern 
Song and anti-Mongolia mountainous towns. Taking 
Sichuan-Shanxi mountainous towns as an example, Tao 
Jinsheng in his Military towns in mountain terrain and 
by riverside: Defense strategy used by the Southern 
Song, demonstrates how Southern Song courtiers take 
well use of military towns in mountainous terrain and by 
riverside in the frontier defense, and he believes that Yu 
Jie’s mountainous military towns have modeled Sichuan-
Shanxi mountainous towns to some extent. Resent years, 
he Hongyu’s study on Sichuan-Shanxi military defense 
has attracted much attention. In the light of central-
local relationship, he discusses Sichuan-shanxi area’s 
strategical status in the Southern Song period. He believes 
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that Mongolian troops’ successful breakthrough in the 
Sichuan-Shanxi area should be due to Southern Song’s 
insufficient deployment on towns and fortress defense. (He, 
2012) Comparing to academics’ studies on Sichuan-Shanxi 
mountainous towns and anti-Mongolia mountainous towns, 
Mongolian military towns constructed haven’t attracted 
sufficient research attention in the Song-Mongolia War. 
In the Song-Mongolia War, Mongolian troops restored 
occupied towns and constructed new ones, and gradually 
controlled and clutched Southern Song’s mountainous 
towns in the Sichuan battlefield. Mongolian military 
towns are important part of historical Sichuan military 
settlements. When discusses about Song-Mongolia War or 
anti-Mongolia mountainous towns, previous researchers 
have occasionally and briefly mentioned them. So far, 
there is no systematically discussion about Mongolian 
military towns’ construction process, their functions in the 
Song-Mongolia War, and their’re the dynamic relationship 
with military tactics. Based on the time line of military 
tactic transformation during the time of Ogedei period, 
Mongka period and Kublai Khan period, this paper tries 
to explore the dynamic relationship between Mongolian 
military towns and military tacitcs as well as their impact 
on Sichuan Battlefield, in terms of temporal and spacial 
dimensions of the Mongolian construction of military 
towns.
1.  MONGOLIA’S SIMPLEX ATTACKING-
AND-RAIDING STRATEGY  IN OGEDEI 
PERIOD IN SICHUAN REGION AND 
SOUTHERN SONG’S CONSTRUCTION 
OF MOUNTAINOUS TOWN DEFENSE 
SYSTEM
In the Ogedei period, the strategy Mongolian troops 
used was to attack the Southern Song by military 
auxiliaries and took loots, which means Mongolian 
troops took temporary benefits ruthlessly without long-
term consideration.” They just kill and rob, and they 
don’t develop the region. After raiding, they abandoned 
the land.” (Duo San Mongolian History, volume one, 
Zhonghua Book Company, 1962, p.257) Ogedei used 
this strategy from the year 1234, when the Mongolia 
troops went into Sichuan, in the year 1241, when 
Ogedei died  of disease. Mongolian troops didn’t occupy 
Sichuan substantially, but just made great damage to 
Sichuan region, which didn’t deprive  the Southern Song 
of its ruling foundation in Sichuan. After that, although 
Southern Song’s Xingzhou (兴州), Mianzhou (沔州), 
Lizhou (利州), Langzhou (阆州), Mianzhou Town (绵
州), Chengdu (成都), Pengzhou (彭州) and  Meizhou 
(眉州) were in the control of enemy for a long period,it 
gradually took back those areas and then constructed a 
mountainous defense system to fight against Mongolian 
Troops, which was successful to some degree.
In 1242, Emperor Song Lizhong appointed Yu 
Jie to lead the Song-Mongolia War in Sichuan as the 
Emperor’s messenger, which called Xuanyushi. Yu 
arrived in Sichuan and found the West Sichuan had 
lost its strategic defense advantage under the attack of 
Mongolian troops, while the East Sichuan was suitable 
to defend against Mongolian cavalry’s long-distance 
raid, where there were five parallel valley. He set up 
command center in Chongqing,  and then recruited 
wisdom men to get solution to save the Southern Song’s 
regime.  Jin Ran and Pu Ran were two brothers from 
Bozhou.They suggested that Song troops shoud take 
advantage of the mountainous terrain and constructed 
military towns there, in which could contain provisions 
and soldiers,and defend  with not so many troops.  So Jie 
Yu constructed military towns along the upper reaches 
of Yangtze River from Kuizhou (夔州), the east end, to 
Jiading (嘉定), the west end. He also built up about 20 
military towns along five north-south oriented rivers, 
which are Tuojiang River (沱江), Minjiang River (岷
江), Fujiang River (涪江), Jialingjiang River (嘉陵江) 
and  Qujiang River (渠江).  All the 20 mountainous 
military towns could mutually support each other and 
formed a defense system based on the advantageous 
terrain of mountains and rivers. They were flexible as a 
whole one. From that time,, the defense system began to 
convert Song’s passive situation in Sichuan battlefield. 
In the year of 1250, the two rivals came into balanced 
confrontation again.
2.  TACTICS IN MONGKA PERIOD TO 
BREAK THROUGH THE RESISTANCE: 
TROOPS STATIONING AND MILITARY 
TO W N S  C O N S T R U C T I O N  I N  T H E 
FRONTIER AREA 
In 1251, Mongka ascended the throne, and Mongolia 
changed its military tactic, which means Mongolian 
troops changed its simplex attacking-and-raiding tactic. 
Kublai, the younger brother of Mongka, was appointed 
to take full responsibility of military activities in Han 
area (where Han people live), which was in the south 
of Mongolia desert. Yao Shu suggested to Kublai that, 
in the Ogedei period, although the troops made great 
achievement, killing and raiding blindly would only terrify 
and drive away those Song generals who originally wanted 
to surrender, and this add to the resistance against Mongolia 
troops. the tacitc not to take land but only raid would empty the 
cities and wasted farmlands. it might be as well to send troops 
to strategic significant position, construct towns and store grain. 
Then, the Southern Song will be perished gradually (Yao, 1936, 
pp.176-177). 
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Mongolian rulers took Yao Sui’s advise, and began 
to  construct military towns in the frontier areas near 
Southern Song, which included Sichuan, Huainan 
and Huaibei (两淮). They grew up wasted farmland, 
attracted residents, and stationed soilders there, as a 
preparation for large-scale wars to perish South Song. 
From 1251 to 1257, Mongolian troops had gradually 
transformed the tactic. In 1251, after the enthronement of 
Mongka, Yu Jie had set up a mutually supported MTDS, 
which combined points into a line, around the center 
Chongqing. At that time, Ogedei’s simplex attacking-
and-raiding tactic had lost its advantage. Mongolian 
Troops wanted to detour around the Southwest, attack 
directly to South Song’s belly part, and then go down 
the Yangtze River to destroy the Southern Song (Song, 
1976, p.3651).
Mongolian troops restored Mianzhou Town and 
Lizhou Town, which was at the entrance of Sichuan 
In the spring of 1252, Commander Wang Decheng 
was ordered by Mongolia to restore Mianzhou Town 
damaged in Sichuan War, to repair housings inside, 
and to set up administrative system to govern the town. 
Mianzhou was a thoroughfare on the upper part of 
Jialingjiang River (Song, 1976, p.3651) and, by which, 
the occupied troops could make a threat to Lizhou and 
Langzhou.  Mongolian troops constructed military town 
in Mianzhou, which could not only control Sichuan from 
the upper reaches, but could also reopen the entrance 
to Sichuan, and this would lay foundation to construct 
Lizhou Town. In the autumn of 1252, Mongka orderd 
Wang Decheng to restore Lizhou Town as a measure 
to take Sichuan (Bi, 1979, p.4729). In 1253, Kublai 
exempted Lizhou’s corvee and taxes after taking the 
report by Wang Decheng. He also set up Water Transport 
Department in Mianzhou, which could help to restore 
Lizhou Town. (Zhang, 1990, p.32) By that, Mongolia 
ruler showed his empahsis on the construction of Lizhou 
Town and the backup function of Mianzhou Town 
By the year of 1254, despite attacks of Song troops, 
Mongolia had restored the Lizhou Town.  Since the 
time, Mongolian troops were established in Lizhou, and 
implemented farming and battling strategy. Southern 
Song troops dared not assault or harass it (Song, 1976, 
p.3653).
When Song troops had established its MTDS in 
Sichuan battlefield, simplex attacking-and-raiding tactic 
in Ogedei period could no longer play an important role. 
In Mongka period, Wang Decheng was firstly ordered to 
constructe town in Mianzhou to control Sichuan from the 
upper reaches, and was then ordered to restore Lizhou 
Town at the entrance of Sichuan. Mongolian troops 
used Southern Song’s tactic to prepare for the march to 
Sichuan. When the Mianzhou Town and Lizhou Town 
were constructed, Mou Zicai, a man from Southern Song, 
said it was a tactic to pass the dangerous areas for the 
Mongolian troops covering 350 km to restore Lizhou 
Town in Sichuan (Mou, 2005, p.120).  
3.  MILITARY STRATEGY TRANSFORMATION 
IN KUBLA KHAN PERIOD AND TOWN 
CONFRONTATION TACTIC
From 1258 to 1259, with the help of Mianzhou Town 
and Lihou Town, Mongka attacked Sichuan with his 
main force. In the spring of 1257, under the order of 
Mongka, Mongolian troops divided into left wing and 
right wing to attack Southern Song. Mongka led the right 
wing troops in person.  Mongka planed to take Sichuan 
by his main force, control the upper reaches of Yangtze 
River, float down along the river, press forward to Song 
capital Linan, and perish Southern Song at one stroke. 
To the autumn of 1258, most of Sichuan areas were 
occupied by Mongolian troops, including Jianzhou (剑
州), Langzhou, Dazhou, Guozhou  (果州) and Quzhou. 
Mongolian troops had basically took the  east Sichuan 
and the north Sichuan. Hereto, the MTDS constructed 
by Yu Jie since 1243 had been partially destroyed. 
Mountain towns in places like Langzhou, Guozhou were 
occupied. In 1258 winter, Mongka arrived in the Fishing 
Town,Hezhou. Mongolian troops had fouhgt against Song 
troops for 8 months here, and it was called The Battle of 
Fishing Town. The Battle had great influence on the world 
history. In this battle,Mongka died and the successor was 
not yet decided, as a result of which, Mongolian troops’ 
slacked attack led to a stalement between the two sides. 
It is worth noticing that Mongolian troops commanded 
by Mongka took different militery tactic from that of 
Ogedei’s. Mongolian troops choose to occupy Song’s 
military towns and station soldiers there, while previously 
they would abandon.  According to historical matetials, 
Song’s military towns Mongolian troops substantially 
occupied include Changning Mountain Town  (长宁山城), 
Dahuocheng Town  (大获城), Qingjucheng Town (青居
城), Yunshancheng Town (运山城), Daliangcheng Town 
(大良城), etc.. In other words, the confrontation line 
moved to the East Sichuan from Mianzhou-Lizhou area 
thereafter. Mountainous towns of Southern Song still left 
were part of those that spread over the Yangtze River and 
the East Sichuan.
After the strategic failure of Mongka’s attempt to 
occupy Sichuan with main force, the new Emperor 
Kubla Khan was busy to consolidate the inner stability 
in Mongolian court, continue to implement Han Means 
(汉法) Police and reform in many aspects, so he took 
defensive position against the Southern Song.  When the 
Mongolian political situation was stabilized, they began to 
plan for large-scale aggression war to perish the Southern 
Song again. In 1260, Soon after the enthornement of 
Kubla Khan, Mongolian nobleman Kan Guo (His political 
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title was Qianhu, 千户) advised that the strategic focus 
of the troops should be moved to Huainan-Huaibei area 
(两淮地区) (Bi, 1979, p.4796). In 1267, a previous 
Southern Song general Liu Zhen advised Kubla Khan 
that the movement of the strategic focus from Sichuan 
to Huainan-Huaibei was feasible (Bi Yuan,History As A 
Mirror continued, pp.4875-4876). Kubla Khan accepted 
the advice and decided to move the military strategic 
focus. In Sichuan, he used a fraction of troops to pin 
down the weakened MDTS, and his main force was to 
attack Xiangyang (襄阳) and Fancheng (樊城). The 
transformed military strategy, as a the aftermath of Kubla 
Khan’s enthronement, directly influenced the solution  to 
fight against Song’s defense system. The new solution 
was town confrontation tactic (以城制城). The strategy 
tried to clutch Soouthern Song troops by Military towns 
constructed in strategic location, gradually cut apart 
Song’s defense system, and then occupy separately
In Kubla Khan period, the attention the town 
confrontation tactic should be paid to four Mongolian 
command centers.They were typical Mongolian towns 
captured from Southern Song,including Qingjucheng 
Town, Dahuocheng Town, Yunchengshan Town and 
Daliangshan Town, where many Mongolian troops 
were stationed there to contain the remained Song 
mountainous towns. Qingjushan Town were surrounded 
by rivers in the east, the north, and the west. However, 
its northern part was relatively far away from rivers so 
that the rivers could not use to construct the town moat. 
The southern part was too flat and had no advantageous 
defensive terrain. In the south of Qingjucheng, the 
Fishing town in Hezhou (合州) was located (Yao 
Sui,Muan collected works, p.201), from which Southern 
Song troops assault and harass it from time to time.
Mongolian troops quatered there was under great 
pressure. Under such circumstances, in the year of 1262, 
Kubla Khan ordered Wang Weizheng, the Commander 
of Shanxi Province and Gongchang (巩昌), send more 
troops to Qingjucheng Town and set up East Sichuan 
Command Center. This deployment in confrontation 
zone, backed up by Qingjucheng, was to contain the 
Hechuan Fishing town which was located on the lower 
part of Jialingjiang River. Except that, three surrendered 
Song general were sent to station troops in three military 
towns. They were Yang  Dayuan  in Dahuocheng Town 
(大获城), Zhang Dayue in Yunshancheng Town  (运
山城),  and Pu Yuangui in Daliangcheng Town (大良
城). When Qingjucheng contained Fishing Town in its 
south, Dahuocheng Town, Yunshancheng Town and 
Daliangcheng Town were able to cross Qujiang River 
(渠江) and expand its military influence on the strip 
area of Dazhou, Kaizhou, Liangshanjun (梁山军) and 
Kuuizhou. Thus, Qingjushan was the parclose for the 
three towns (Yao, 1936, p.202). Before 1262, when 
Kubla Khan was busy to stabilize the inner political 
situation, Mongolian troops had captured  Qingjucheng 
Town, Dahuocheng Town and Daliangcheng Town, 
which not only reinforced military achievement made in 
Mongka period, but also laid ground for the Mongolia 
to construct military towns against South Song’s defense 
system.
After 1262, in order to decrease military pressure 
and contain its counterpart, Mongolian troops began 
to construct military towns intentionally. To stop the 
Southern Song’s assaults and harassments, Mongolian 
troops restored Meishancheng Town (眉山城) and 
Jianzhoucheng Town (简州城). Southern Song troops 
regarded Jiadingcheng  Town as the most important 
position to control the east Sichuan. For example, when 
Southern Song lost Chengdu, the Southern Song troops 
harassed Mongolia-occupied east Sichuan for many 
times from Jiadingcheng Town Another example was 
that, in 1260, a Southern Song navy of 2000 soldiers 
went up along the river and moved close to Xinjiang (岷
江), nearby Chengdu, but it was repelled by Mongolian 
general Hudu (Song, 1976, p.3278). Mongolian troops 
also harassed Jiadingcheng Town to stop its attacking 
intention, but it was not successful. Under such conditions, 
Mongolian began to construct military towns to contain 
Jiading’s Song troops, by constructing military towns. 
In 1266, Liu Yuanli made a report to Kubla Khan and 
advised that Mongolia should restore Meizhou Town to 
control the main road between Chengdu and Jiadingcheng 
Town (Bi, 1979, p.4868). In 1267, His advise was agreed 
by Kubla Khan and he rudimentarily restored Meizhou 
Town within 7 days. Almost at the same time, Mongolian 
General Zhang Wanjianu was ordered to restore Jianzhou 
Town which located in the east of Chengdu.Then Jianzhou 
and Meizhou formed defense system against Chengdu.
To contain the Song troops in Fishing Town, Mongolia 
constructed Mudezhang Mountain Town (母德章山城) 
and Wushengcheng Town (武胜城) in order. Under that 
circumstance, Hezhou was a place of strategic importance 
that the two sides both strive for, with Guozhou and 
Langzhou in its north, and Chonging in its south. With 
the advantageous location of Hezhou, Fishing Town 
became important protective shield for Chongqing. Based 
on Qingjucheng Town, Mongolia continued to construct 
towns in its south to stop Song troops in Fishing Town to 
develop its military influence northwardly, which spacially 
limited its military activity In 1262, Mongolian general 
Wang Liangcheng suggested to construct Wushengcheng 
Town to contain Fishing Town, which would be placed in 
the south of Qingjucheng Town. (Bi, 1979, p.4825). After 
1263, in the command of General Zhang Yu, the Song 
troops were more powerful than before. For this reason, 
in 1267, Wang suggested to constructed Mudezhang 
Mountain Town to contain the Fishing Town, which was 
on the south bank of Jialingjiang River (Bi, 1979, p.4874). 
To the year of 1268, Mongolia renamed Mudezhang 
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Mountainous town to Dingyuancheng Town (定远城), 
and Wushengcheng to Wushengjun Town (武胜军), from 
which Mongolia’s military purposes could be showed. 
Mudezhang Mountain Town and Wushengcheng Town 
worked together to form a powerful system, which can 
both defend Qingjucheng and attack Fishing town. The 
three towns contained Song troops in Hezhou.
To consolidate its ruling in occupied Tongchuan 
area, Liu Yuanli contructed Pengxi Fastness (蓬溪寨). 
In 1265, When Xia Gui, General of Zhizhi (制置) with 
his fifty thousand soldiers attacked Tongchuan, the two 
sides were engaged in lasting battles in Pengxi area, and 
Liu Yuanli thought the loss of the area meant the loss of 
Tongchuan.  It was easy to know Pengxi Town was not far 
from Tongchuancheng, controlling the main road outside 
the latter. So Yuan Yuanli constructed Pengxi Fastness 
to guard Tongchuangcheng Town, which reinforced the 
control in this area.  Besides, Tongchuancheng was located 
in the connecting point between Chengdu and Chongqing. 
It was strategically important. Mongolian troops often 
assist Chengdu Qingjucheng from Tongchuan. In light 
of this perspective, Pengxi Town not only provided 
protection to Mongolian troops in Tongchuan, but also 
gave much strategic space.
To capture Kuizhou area, Mongolian troops had 
constructed a group of military towns in the band of 
Quzhou, Dazhou and Kaizhou, including Zhangguangping 
Mountain Town (章广平山寨), Huxiaocheng Town (虎啸
城), Panlongcheng Town (蟠龙城), Fangdoucheng Town 
(方斗城), Jintangcheng Town (金汤城) and Shenxian 
Mountain Town (神仙山城). In 1261, Daliangcheng 
Town in Quzhou was took back by Song troops, and they 
blocked Mongolian’s access from Qingju to Kuizhou 
across Qujiang River. To break through Song’s blockage 
and achieve the plan to go down along the river after the 
capture of Kuizhou, Mongolian troops began to send 
troops continuously to the areas of Quzhou, Kaizhou 
and Dazhou, as a result of which, many military towns 
had been constructed to contain Song’s mountain towns. 
In 1262, Yang Wenan constructed military town on the 
main road between Kuizhou and Dazhou, cuting off 
the connection of the two towns.  In 1263, Yang Wenan 
continued to construct Fangdoucheng Town as the 
assisting backup for Panlongcheng Town (Song, 1976, 
pp.3778-3779); Daliangcheng Town was took forth and 
back between Song and Mongolia in the period. When it 
was captured by the southern Song, Mongolia constructed 
Huxiaocheng Town and Zhangpin Mountain Town 
successively. In 1263, Zhang Tingrui in the Qingjucheng 
Command Center dispatched an army to Kaizhou and 
Dazhou, which constructed Longxiaocheng Town along 
the Qujiang River. It broke through the passway across 
Qujiang River and contained Dalinag Town (Song, 1976, 
p.3778). In 1269, general of east Kuizhou province 
constructed Zhangguangpin Montain Town in the main 
road outside Daliangcheng Town. By the sucessful 
construction of this town, Mongolia won most of battles 
against Song troops in Daliang town; Besides, in order 
to contain Song’s Kaizhou Town and Dazhou town, 
Mongolia constructed Jintang Town and Shenxian town in 
order.  In 1272, Yang Wenan built up Jintangcheng Town 
against the defensive fortress Longzhua Cheng. In 1275, 
the Southern Song general Ge De took back Kaizhou 
town, and Yang Wenan constructed Shenxian Mountain 
Town to contain (Song, 1976,  p.3771).
After 1262, based on those occupied towns, Mongolia 
constructed more military towns to fight against Song, 
with the intention to cut apart the Song defense system 
by the construction of towns in the main road and 
strategic location connecting Song’s mountain town. To 
stop Song’s harassment, Mongolia restored  Meizhou 
and Jianzhou to control the main road between Jiading 
and Chengdu. To contain Song’s troop in Hezhou, 
Mongolia moved southward from Qingjucheng and 
constructed Mudezhang Mountain Town and Wusheng 
Town. The two towns are on one hand had restrained 
Song’s troops in Hezhou, and on the other hand ease 
the pressure on Qingjucheng. To reinforce the control 
in Tongchuan area against Song, Mongolia constructed 
Pengxi Fastness there and stabilized the access between 
the east Mongolian troops and the west Mongolian 
troops. In Kuizhou, Kaizhou and Dazhou, Mongolian 
troops controlled the main road between Kuizou and 
Kaizhou by Panlongcheng Town and Fangdoucheng 
Town, contained Dazhou by Jintang Town, contained 
Kaizhou by Shenxian Mountain Town, and controlled 
Dal iang Town in  Quzhou by Huxiao Town and 
Zhangguangpin mountain Town.  After that, in Kubla 
Khan period, Mongolia contained Song’s defense system 
with a fraction of troops in the town confrontation 
tactic. 
CONCLUSION
As for the research on Song-Mongolia war, Mongolia’s 
dynamic transformation of military tactics is worth much 
attention as well as Song’s military tactics and mountain 
town. After the breakout of Song-Mongolia war, 
Mongolian military tactics are transformed in a dynamic 
way. In the Ogedei period, the insufficient provision and 
weak defense of the Southern Song provided Mongolian 
troops the opportunity to come into Sichuan, when 
Mongolia at that time just attacking and raiding; in the 
Mongka period, the Southern Song reorganized the 
troops and provisions, and build up mountainous defense 
system against Mongolia when Mongka died. To deal 
with Song’s defense system, Mongolia took the tactic of 
stationing troops and constructing towns to take place of 
the previous strategy. They first constructed Mianzhou 
town outside the entrance of Sichuan, and then sent 
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troops into the entrance to construct Lizhou Town under 
risky conditions, by which they took the advantageous 
terrain in the entrance, and then confronted with Song’s 
troops in Lizhou and Dazhou area. They also made 
massive attack on Song’s mountain town, trying to 
occupy Sichuan at one stroke. In kubla Khan period, 
the Emperor transferred the military focus to Jingzhou-
Xiangyang area (荆襄地区), lefting only partial troops 
to contain the weakened mountainous defense system. 
During that time, Mongolian troops consolidated 
their occupied towns and constructed more towns in 
strategic places to paralyze Song’s defense system, 
which separated Song’s towns and deprived its ability to 
assist each other.  Except that, as the military conditions 
changed and Mongolian strategies transformed, the 
towns they constructed showed different features. In 
Mongka period, Song and its counterpart confronting 
each other in Shukou area (蜀口, the entrance of 
Sichuan). It was to break through the Shukou that 
Mongolia took risk to construct Lizhou Town inside the 
Shukou after the building-up of Mianzhou, which was 
a preoaration for massive attack. In kubla Khan period, 
because the military focus had been transferred, the 
military towns were built for containing Song’s towns 
and occupying them at convenience. By studying the 
military towns constructed by Mongolia, it was easy to 
find Mongolia gradually changed its military tactics to 
fit in mountainous terrain for protracted war. It was the 
same that Mongolian towns were not constructed at short 
time, which were built up during Mongka period and to 
Kubla Khan period, and the tactics also changed, when 
at first they constructed towns in frontal zone and later 
in strategic position to control Song troops. 
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